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LAW, POLITICS AND THE HOMELESS
INEZ SMITH REID*
I. INTRODUCTION
The plight of the homeless is one of the most vexing social problems con-
fronting policy makers in this country. So pervasive is this problem that it touched
the 1984 presidential election, and prompted the incumbent president to make a
promise concerning the establishment of a model facility for the homeless in
Washington, D.C., a promise that became the subject of legal action in 1985.'
Had the social problem of the homeless emerged publicly in the decade of
the sixties, undoubtedly it would have been handled by President Lyndon John-
son's "Great Society" and "War on Poverty," and perhaps even resolved in large
measure by funding through programs such as Model Cities. Moreover, the plight
of the homeless certainly would have captured the imagination and commanded
the legal talents of dedicated poverty lawyers who were determined to establish
a constitutional right to life, including the basics of human existence: food, shelter,
and even medical care.
However, the social problem called "homelessness" did emerge in full bloom,
but not in the days of the "War on Poverty" which was designed to help realize
* Counsel, Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley, Myerson & Casey, Wash-
ington, D.C.; Former Corporation Counsel, District of Columbia; B.A., Tufts University, 1959; L.L.B.,
Yale University, 1962; M.A., U.C.L.A., 1963; Ph.D., Columbia University, 1968. The author was
the William J. Maier, Jr. Visiting Professor of Law at West Virginia University in 1985-86.
1 On November 4, 1984, two days prior to the 1984 presidential election, Mitch Snyder of the
Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV), the foremost advocate for the homeless, was in the
midst of a fast that already had lasted for 51 days. The fast had drawn national attention and ended
when the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, promised to turn a Washington, D.C.
dilapidated 800 bed shelter for the homeless, run by Mitch Snyder's CCNV, into a model facility.
When the Reagan Administration attempted to step away from that promise, a lawsuit, Robert Robbins
v. Ronald Reagan, Civil Action No. 85-1963, was filed in summer 1985 in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia on behalf of homeless persons residing at the shelter, known as
the Second Street shelter. In December, 1985, a District Court judge Charles R. Richey ruled that
the United States could close the shelter. Robbins v. Reagan, 616 F. Supp. 1259 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd,
780 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1985). However, President Reagan stopped plans for evicting the homeless
from the shelter; these plans would have been implemented in late December 1985. The federal gov-
ernment then, over the opposition of the CCNV, some citizens of the District of Columbia, and
public officials in Washington, D.C., opened another shelter and funded a non-profit group to operate
the facility. A number of CCNV adherents were totally dissatisfied and began political action and
publicity to obtain funds to renovate the Second Street shelter. In mid-February 1986, Mitch Snyder
began another fast. When his health began to deteriorate in mid-March 1986, key actors, including
the Federal government, the District of Columbia government, and the CCNV agreed to a resolution
of the longstanding dispute concerning the President's 1984 promise. Under the March 16, 1986,
resolution, title to the Second Street shelter was given to the District of Columbia government, which
in turn agreed to lease the shelter to the CCNV. The federal government also agreed to provide five
million dollars to renovate the Second Street shelter. On April 30, 1986, the federal government also
closed another shelter which it operated through another non-profit group. The Congress must ratify
the land transaction.
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an ideal "Great Society." Rather, the problem has surfaced full bloom in changing
and economically troubling times. Moreover, the homelessness social problem has
appeared when the United States Supreme Court is being meager with additions
to its list of Equal Protection suspect classifications, and at a time when the
Court is increasingly unreceptive to an expansion of fundamental rights and in-
terests under either the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. Indeed, instead
of a desire to protect allegedly disadvantaged groups or to embrace the perceived
need for recognition of certain interests as fundamental, the Supreme Court has
revealed a clear desire to leave deep socioeconomic questions to the legislative
chambers and the legislative process rather than resolving them through judicial
decision. This clear desire may be traceable to the discomfort of tackling one
problem with reasoned theory, only to discover that new but related cases prove
even more difficult to decide within a framework of principled and rational legal
theory.
Furthermore, the vexing problem of the homeless has intensified just as the
society is realizing the fruits of a conscious policy of deinstitutionalization (e.g.,
of the mentally ill and the mentally retarded), the results of decades of drug and
alcohol abuse, the disaffection and disassociation of teenagers with their families,
and the emergence of permanent pockets of poverty referred to by some as the
"underclass." Then, too, the setting for the homeless problem is marked by ded-
ication to budget cutting and deficit reduction, traceable in part to a national
policy of federal government retreat which in turn has placed significant strains
on state and local resources. These complications have presented a serious chal-
lenge to states and localities to develop a rationally planned allocation of their
limited resources.
The political, social, and economic context in which the problem of the home-
less has arisen makes it extraordinarily difficult to protect this very vulnerable
and stigmatized segment of America's current population through appeal to the
legislative or the judicial process. The flow of government benefits and entitle-
ments has been laden with obstacles, the suspect classification analysis of Equal
Protection theory has been virtually unavailable to new classes, and the path of
fundamental rights, once vibrant and expansive, has become stagnant.
This article focuses on the District of Columbia in examining a long, dis-
couraging, still pending struggle to establish a right to a government benefit,
entitlement, or statutory entitlement to shelter for the homeless. It then explores
the suspect classification and fundamental rights theories as sources for the es-
tablishment of a right to shelter for the homeless in contemporary America. Fi-
nally, it suggests that the tendency to turn to the political or legislative arenas
to resolve the problem of the homeless overlooks an urgent need for the statement
of clear principles that will govern the existence of one of the most vulnerable
and stigmatized populations of our current society.
[Vol. 89
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II. THE LONG STRUGGLE TO ESTABLISH A STATUTORY ENTITLEMENT TO
SHELTER FOR THE HOMELESS IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUBMIA: LEGAL AND
POLITICAL COMPLICATIONS
Williams v. Barry2 signaled the initial stage of an effort to establish a statutory
entitlement to shelter for the homeless in Washington, D.C. When advocates of
the homeless commenced legal action in May 1980, it is doubtful that they en-
visioned a struggle that would continue into the last half of the 1980s. As late
as May 1986, the issue of a statutory entitlement to shelter in the District of
Columbia remained unresolved.
Tracing the tortuous path of the search for a statutory entitlement reveals
the difficulty of establishing a right to shelter based on a state statutory entitle-
ment. It also reveals the political complications facing the hybrid form of
government 3 situated in the nation's capital, at the seat of federal power and the
arena of intricate political power struggles.
The first strategy of the advocates of the homeless was to draw upon the
growth of an idea, the idea of a governmental benefit embodying a right or an
entitlement. According to this idea, the judiciary would recognize the entitlement
for those on the edge of subsistence to receive the minimum needs of life from
government. 4 As written by Charles Reich, an early advocate of this idea,
The concept of right is most urgently needed with respect to benefits like un-
employment compensation, public assistance, and old age insurance. These ben-
efits are based upon a recognition that misfortune and deprivation are often caused
by forces far beyond the control of the individual, such as technological change,
variations in demand for goods, depressions, or wars. The aim of these benefits
2 Williams v. Barry, 490 F. Supp. 941 (D.D.C. 1980), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 708 F.
2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
The District of Columbia has the responsibility and functions both of a city and state gov-
ernment. Although it has local legislative power which has been delegated from the United States
Congress, the ultimate legislative power rests in the Congress and is exclusive and plenary under
Article 1, Section 7, Paragraph 17 of the Constitution of the United States. In Feldman v. Gardner,
661 F.2d 1295, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1106 (1982), vacated, 460 U.S. 462
(1983), Chief Judge Spotswood W. Robinson III, described the District government as "a semi-
autonomous governmental unit, an entity unique in our governmental structure." Traditionally, the
majority of the District of Columbia population, now predominantly minority, has identified itself
with the liberal and democratic spectrum of American politics. Thus, the presence of a conservative
and Republican national administration has produced philosophical as well as political tensions between
the federal government and the local District government.
4 A. Samuel Krislov reveals the goal of early welfare rights lawyers to establish a constitutional
guarantee of human life, a "right to life." This goal, says Krislov, was traceable to a concept taken
from A. SMITH'S work, THE RIGHT TO LIFE (1955). As Krislov put it, "Smith's doctrinal contribution
of the 'right to life' was that of entitlement, that every individual in the society is entitled as of right
to receive the minimum needs of life from that society." See Krislov, The OEO Lawyers Fail to
Constitutionalize a Right to Welfare: A Study in the Uses and Limits of the Judicial Process, 58
MINN. L. REV. 211, 230 (1973).
19861
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is to preserve the self-sufficiency of the individual, to rehabilitate him where
necessary, and to allow him to be a valuable member of a family and a com-
munity; in theory they represent part of the individual's rightful share in the
commonwealth. Only by making such benefits into rights can the welfare state
achieve its goals of providing a secure minimum basis for the individual well-
being and dignity in a society where each man cannot be wholly the master of
his own destiny.5
The Supreme Court of the United States embraced this notion of government
benefits as entitlements, and placed the concept within the context of the Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process Clause by focusing on the word "property." In
Goldberg v. Kelly,6 the Supreme Court noted that welfare benefits "are a matter
of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them." '7 Furthermore, the
Court acknowledged its partial indebtedness to Charles Reich: "It may be realistic
today to regard welfare entitlements as more like 'property' than a 'gratuity.'
Much of the existing wealth in this country takes the form of rights that do not
fall within traditional common-law concepts of property."' The Court continued
its development of the entitlements concept in Board of Regents of State Colleges
v. Roth9 and Perry v. Sinderman.'° The property interest flowing from a benefit
is based on "existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law."" Moreover,a property interest in a benefit cannot be
based on "an abstract need or desire" nor may it be based solely on a "unilateral
expectation.' ' 2 Nonetheless, it may be traced to "actually explicit understandings
that support [a] claim of entitlement to the benefit. . . .""
A. Phase One of the Struggle: Depending on "Mutually Explicit Under-
standings"
The words "mutually explicit understandings" played a major role in the
Williams v. Barry strategy. The plaintiffs in Williams attempted to show that,
beginning in early 1978, the local government of Washington, D.C. had created
''actually explicit understandings" that homeless persons had a right to shelter
provided by the District of Columbia government. The actions and words of
government officials supposedly established the "mutually explicit understand-
ings" as well as "a state fostered expectation of continued shelter services."' 4
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733, 785-786 (1964).
6 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
7 Id. at 262.
Id. At n. 8.
Board of Regents of St. Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Roth].
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
Roth, 408 U.S. at 564. See also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S 422, 430 (1982)
in which the Supreme Court stated: "The hallmark of property . . . is an individual entitlement
grounded in state law .... "
" Roth, 408 U.S. at 564.
Perry, 408 U.S. at 601.
' Pertinent actions and words included: the use of two public schools, beginning in 1978, to
house approximately 330 homeless men per night, execution of a contract between the District gov-
[Vol. 89
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Using this approach, the plaintiffs were able to persuade the district court to enter
a temporary restraining order against the District government. The district court
concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their case
because:
I) "the homeless persons possess a property interest in continued occupancy
and use of their shelter;"'" and
2) the shelters for homeless persons amounted to a statutory entitlement.'
6
Further, the court stated that the actions of District officials "constitute...
the consistent, positive action . . . necessary to find an entitlement in the absence
of a statute.' 7 In effect, "[tihe City created a state fostered expectation of con-
tinued shelter services. This expectation, created by the City, rose above the level
of mere hope or desire. The continued funding of the shelters therefore may also
amount to a 'mutually explicit understanding'."' 8
The district court opinion in Williams v. Barry was a victory for the ad-
vocates of the homeless, but it was a short victory. The Williams case moved
forward through the judicial process, eventually confronting the United States
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in 1983.19 Judge Harry T. Edwards, writing
for a panel of three judges, severely impaired the significance of the district court's
earlier ruling. Judge Edwards circumvented the entitlement question and, in doing
so, observed that the evidence of entitlement was "weak and inconsistent."120 In
his concurring opinion, Justice Bork was even more blunt:
Judge Edwards makes clear that the claim to a "property interest" in homeless
men's shelter here is insubstantial and will not support any claims that additional
process is due.
ernment and the Gospel Mission for the housing of about 60 homeless men per night, the February
1979 announcement of Mayor Marion Barry, Jr.'s "Policy on Homelessness" which included a state-
ment that "shelter is a basic right," the establishment of a Mayor's Commission on Homelessness,
and a 1979 agreement between the Commmission and the Mayor concerning the "operation of some
of the shelters." Williams, 490 F. Supp. at 942-943.
11 Id. at 946.
Id. at 946-947.
Id. at 947.
, Id. In Caton v. Berry, 500 F. Supp. 45 (D.D.C. 1980) there was an attempt to enjoin the
District from closing a shelter facility and transferring residents to another facility. Judge Oberdorfer
observed that based on Williams, there was a "colorable claim to an entitlement to some minimal
form of shelter that cannot be denied without due process of law." Caton, 500 F. Supp. at 48.
"However," continued Judge Oberdorfer, "the plan now proposed by the [District government] in
no way infringes upon this protected interest." Id. Thus, "the ... plaintiffs can no longer claim to
be suffering from a deprivation of any constitutionally protected interest." Id. at 49. And "[a]Ithough
it may be that transfer will have an effect on plaintiffs, the existence of some adverse impact on
plaintiffs by a government decision does not form the predicate for finding a constitutional property
or liberty interest requiring due process protection." Id. at 52.
Williams v. Barry, 708 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Judge Edwards stated that "[wle need not resolve the question whether the statements, dec-
larations, and actions of City officials created a constitutionally cognizable entitlement. But the weak
1986]
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No one has plausibly maintained that there is a constitutional or other legal right
to city-provided shelter .... 2
Hence, Justice Bork's views were similar to those of the Supreme Court, displaying
the desire to shy away from its previous approach to government benefits, prop-
erty interests, and entitlements. In fact, the promise of Goldberg, Roth, and Perry
began to evaporate in the 1970s as the Supreme Court seemed to lay the foun-
dation for curbing, and perhaps ultimately rejecting, the entitlement approach.
The first setback came in 1970 with the case of Dandridge v. Williams." In Dan-
dridge, the Court rejected efforts of poverty lawyers to establish even greater rights
for those dependent on welfare benefits. The second major blow came in 1976
with the decisions in Mathews v. Eldridge,21 Bishop v. Wood,24 and Paul v. Davis.21
and inconsistent nature of the evidence of entitlement provides further support for our ultimate de-
termination that the District Court accorded the homeless men all the process they are due." Id. at
792.
2, Id. at 793 (Bork, J., concurring).
22 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). Dandridge involved a challenge to Maryland's
maximum AFDC welfare grant regulation. The Supreme Court sustained the validity of Maryland's
regulation. The Court found no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause
because "[i]n the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect." Id. at 485. Moreover, the
Court saw no conflict with its Goldberg decision. "The Constitution may impose certain procedural
safeguards upon systems of welfare administration [citing Goldberg]. But the Constitution does not
empower this Court to second-guess state officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating
limited public welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients." Id. at 487. Thus, the Supreme
Court tipped the balance to the side of state interests in the face of limited resources, rather than
to the side of the interests of welfare recipients in the adequacy of governmental benefits. See also
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), and Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestion for the Revival
of Substantive Due Process, 1975 Sup. CT. Rav. 261.
1 Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Eldridge, the Court refused to consider dis-
ability benefits under the Social Security Act in the same category as the welfare benefits examined
in Goldberg. Thus, no pretermination hearing was required. The Court distinguished Goldberg by
pointing out that "welfare assistance is given to persons on the very margin of subsistence," Id. at
340, whereas "eligibility for disability benefits ... is not based upon financial need." Mashaw describes
Eldridge as a "retrenchment from the [Supreme Court's] procedurally interventionist posture in the
early 1970s." J. DAsHAw, D E PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE, 104, 161 (1985). See also
Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property" Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State,
62 CORNELL L. REv. 445 (1977), and Note, Discriminations Against The Poor And The Fourteenth
Amendment, 81 fHARv. L. REv. 435, 439 (1967).
2 Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). In Bishop, the Court held that a city policeman who
was dismissed from his job had no protected property interest because he held his job at the pleasure
of the city. Moreover, the Court refused to recognize any violation of a liberty interest based on the
stigma of dismissal from his job. The Court concluded that: "The federal court is not the appropriate
forum in which to review the multitude of personnel decisions that are made daily by public agencies."
Id. at 349. Further, said the Court, "[i]n the absence of any claim that the public employer was
motivated by a desire to curtail or to penalize the exercise of an employee's constitutionally protected
rights, we must presume that official action was regular and, if erroneous, can best be corrected in
other ways. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not a guarantee against incorrect
or ill-advised personnel decisions." Id. at 350.
21 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). In Paul, the Supreme Court held that including a person's
name and picture on a flyer of "active shop-lifters" was not a violation of a property or liberty
[Vol. 89
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B. Phase Two of the Struggle: The Effort to Establish a Statutory Entitle-
ment Through the Initiative Process
The "negative" trend in property rights and entitlement cases and the Court
of Appeals decision in Williams v. Barry both played a role in the next strategy
embraced by the advocates of the homeless in Washington, D.C. The new strategy
involved an attempt to create an actual statutory entitlement to shelter rather than
depending on the mutally explicit understandings approach.
Instead of seeking the direct enactment of a pertinent local law by the Council
of the District of Columbia, the advocates of the homeless decided to appeal for
support to the total electorate through the local initiative process. On December
23, 1983, the advocates presented a proposed initiative to the District of Columbia
Board of Elections and Ethics. That initiative was known as the "District of
Columbia Right to Overnight Shelter Initiative of 1983," which soon became
trapped in a web of legal and political maneuvers. Even as late as the early months
of 1986, the fate of the initiative was still unclear.
The Board of Elections moved expeditiously to set the stage for an eventual
vote on the initiative. It gave its initial approval and certified the measure for
the citizens' petition process in February 1984. This allowed the proponents of
the initiative 180 days to gather a requisite number of signatures from the elec-
torate to place the initiative on the November 1984 ballot.26 This task was ac-
complished and on August 1, 1984, the Board certified the initiative, now referred
to as Initiative 17, for the November 1984 general election ballot.
Although the Executive Branch of the District of Columbia government, which
had to defend against the suit in Williams v. Barry, had been publicly silent (as
a government)27 on Initiative 17, internal discussions were in progress. Of utmost
concern was how the District of Columbia Court of Appeals would handle a
pending case involving an unemployment compensation initiative, as well as the
prohibition in District law against using the initiative process to advance any
proposed law which could be interpreted as "[a]" law making an appropriation."
On August 22, 1984, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals handed down
the awaited decision, District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics v. Phinis
Jones.28 In essence, the court ruled that the unemployment compensation initiative
interest. This was true because "reputation" alone, apart from some more tangible interests such as
employment does not constitute either "'liberty' nor 'property' sufficient to invoke the procedural
protection of the Due Process Clause. Furthermore, the individual did not assert "denial of any right
vouchsafed to him by the State and thereby protected under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at
712.
D.C. law generally requires 5% of the registered voters to agree to placing an initiative on
the ballot. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-282, and 1-1320 (i) (1981). In numbers, some 21,024 signatures
were required before Initiative 17 could be placed on the ballot.
" Mayor Marion Barry, Jr. was one of those whose signatures appeared on a petition to place
Initiative 17 on the ballot.
1' District of Columbia Bd. of Elections and Ethics v. Jones, 481 A.2d 456 (D.C. App. 1984)
[hereinafter cited as Phinis Jones].
1986]
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was an improper subject of the initiative process because it constituted a law
making an appropriation.
The Phinis Jones decision launched an intense controversy over the validity
of Initiative 17 which ultimately spilled into the judicial and political arenas of
the District government, and into the national political forum. To understand the
controversy, one must begin with the specific provisions of Initiative 17, and then
examine the rather nebulous provision of the District's law which prohibited laws
making appropriations.
The right to shelter for the homeless, sought through the judicial process in
Williams v. Barry, is clearly enunciated in Section 2 of Initiative 17: "All persons
in the District of Columbia shall have the right to adequate overnight shelter."
' 29
The only limitation on the right to shelter for those eligible was the requirement
that they be willing "to abide by reasonable regulations governing the operation
of shelter facilities." 30 Immediate questions were generated by the wording of
Section 2: Did it create an immediate and automatic right? Did it create a statutory
entitlement? Does "adequate overnight shelter" mean more than decent lodging,
and does it include other necessities of life such as food, clothing, and medical
care?
Initiative 17 defined the homeless both in the traditional sense of those persons
without living accommodations and those persons subjected to the battered spouse
or battered child syndrome." Sections 5 and 6 of the Initiative contained words
suggesting that the right to shelter was not immediate or automatic, nor was it
a statutory entitlement. Nonetheless, Section 7 appeared to resolve the ambiguity
in favor of a statutory entitlement. Section 5 required the Mayor to determine
the number of homeless "desiring shelter" and the availability and adequacy of
shelter.3 2 Section 6 mandated action by the Mayor to provide shelter but relieved
the Mayor of the burden of giving shelter to those who enter the District to obtain
shelter, or who refuse to abide by the rules of the shelter facility.33 Aside from
"Adequate overnight shelter" was defined as "that which to a reasonable degree maintains,
protects, and supports human health, in accessible, safe, sanitary, and has an atmosphere of reasonable
dignity." D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-601 (Supp. 1986).
" See Section 3, Initiative Measure No. 17, "District of Columbia Right to Overnight Shelter
Initiative of 1984." Now Codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-602 (Supp. 1986).
"1 See Section 4 which defined a homeless person as: 1) a person with "no present possessory
interest in an accommodation" and "lacks the means necessary to obtain such interest;" and 2) a
person with a possessory interest in an accommodation who "is unable to secure entry to that ac-
commodation" or fears abuse in the accommodation ip that "occupation ... would likely lead to
violence from another occupant." D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-603 (Supp. 1986).
"2 Under Section 5, the Mayor has 30 days to make the initial requisite determination and must
make such determination on an annual basis thereafter. D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-604 (Supp. 1986).
31 Under Section 5, the Mayor "shall take reasonable steps to provide health-maintaining and
accessible overnight shelter space offered in an atmosphere of reasonable dignity to all homeless
persons." The action must be taken "within 30 days of the assessment required by § 3-604 (Section
5)." Moreover, "[s]helter need not be provided ... to persons who can be shown to have entered the
District of Columbia for the express purpose of obtaining free shelter ... or who are unwilling to
[Vol. 89
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the difficulties of proof and the complexities of determining a person's intent
within the context of Initiative 17, the prohibition on shelter to persons who
journey to the District just to gain access to shelter appeared at least to raise the
question of whether Initiative 17 violated a person's right to interstate migration,
and whether the initiative penalized this constitutional right. However, since the
prohibition did not neatly fall into the durational residency requirement category,
it is at least arguable that the principles enunciated in Shapiro v. Thompson
3 4
and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County 5 could not be used to invalidate this
prohibition. This is especially true in light of cases such as Dunn v. Blumstein
36
where the Court stated that "appropriately defined and uniformly applied bona
fide residence requirements 3 7 could be held valid, and Martinez v. Bynum3 s which
involved a residency provision similar to that found in Initiative 17.
Section 7 accords a private right of action to the homeless to enforce the
right to shelter. Simultaneously, Section 7 lifts the exhaustion of remedies barrier
to litigation, removes the right of the government to assert sovereign immunity
to block the effectiveness of legal action, and permits the assessment and award
of reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs to a prevailing homeless person.
comply with duly enacted rules and regulations governing operation and use of shelter facilities."
D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-605 (Supp. 1986).
" Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). The Court concluded that the one year residency
requirement for welfare benefits infringed the constitutionally protected right of interstate migration
or travel, and no compelling state interest could justify the residency classification; therefore the
classification was invidious.
-" Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974). Here the Court concluded that
a man who had journeyed to Arizona for medical reasons was penalized for his interstate migration
because of the Arizona one year residency requirement as a condition for receiving medical care at
government expense. Both Shapiro v. Thompson and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County involved
the basic necessities of life.
36 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
" Id. at 342 n.13.
" Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983). It should be noted that in the Memorial Hospital
case the Court rejected a fiscal argument and concluded that such an argument was inadequate to
support a durational residency requirement. "The conservation of the taxpayer's purse is simply not
a sufficient state interest to sustain a durational residence requirement which, in effect, severely pen-
alizes the exercise of the right to freely migrate and settle in another state." Memorial Hospital, 415
U.S . at 263. Martinez involved a child who was born in the United States in 1969, was taken to
Mexico to live until 1977, and was then sent to Texas to live with his sister in order to attend school.
Section 21.031 of the TEX. ED. CODE ANN. provided that "it must be established that [the child's]
presence in the school district is not for the primary purpose of attending the public free schools."
The Supreme Court sustained the statute on the ground that the constitution permits a state to restrict
eligibility for tuition-free education to its bona fide residents. Further, the Court noted that, "[a]
bona fide residence requirement, appropriately defined and uniformly applied, furthers the substantial
state interest in assuring that services provided for its residents are enjoyed only by residents. Such
a requirement with respect to attendance in public free schools does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It does not burden or penalize the constitutional right of
interstate travel, for any person is free to move to a state and to establish a residence there. A bona
fide residence requirement simply requires that the person does establish residence before demanding
the services that are restricted to residents." Martinez, 461 U.S. at 328-329.
1986]
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This provision could be interpreted as ending any speculation as to whether In-
itiative 17 establishes a statutory entitlement or a mandatory right. If the right
to shelter was considered to depend on the discretion of the Mayor, then there
apparently would be no reason to include a private right of acton provision to
enforce the right to shelter, unless the drafters believed that the Mayor would
consistently abuse his discretion in this matter.
Clearly then, if Initiative 17 contained a statutory entitlement, as it at least
arguably did, fiscal implication surrounded the initiative, and could provide a
stumbling block to its validity. The court in Phinis Jones concluded that the
citizens of the District could not "use the initiative to launch the appropriations
process", and that an initiative which "would compel a prohibited interference
with the management of the financial affairs of the District" could not stand.
Phinis Jones seemed to have negative meaning for Initiative 17 but the matter
was not without doubt, particularly since the court's explication of its conclusion
contained the word "automatic" in a key passage:
We see no distinction between the effect on fiscal planning of this provision (the
unemployment compensation initiative increasing benefit levels after the legislature
had reduced them in 1983), which calls for automatic increases in unemployment
benefits, and that of a provision which would authorize an automatic raise for
all D.C. government employees. Either would compel a prohibited interference
with the management of the financial affairs of the District9 (emphasis added).
While the unemployment compensation initiative, and apparently the court's own
comparative example, contained explicit (or in the case of the comparative ex-
ample, at least implicit) specific dollar amounts, Initiative 17 was silent on the
matter of funding. It is not suprising then, that the District government decided
to challenge Initiative 1740 despite: 1) the humane issue involved, 2) the political
attractiveness and inevitability of granting aid to a highly vulnerable population
located in the nation's capitol, and 3) the Board of Elections and Ethics' approval
of the initiative for the November 1984 ballot. Neither the underlying laws regarding
prohibited initiatives, nor the court's interpretation of those laws provided comfort
against the possibility of citizens using the initiative process, on a variety of issues,
to compel the government to fund desired benefits, activities, and projects. Yet,
repeated resort to the initiative process, without adequate concern for fiscal im-
pact, inevitably would destroy any notion of rational fiscal planning, and could
possibly thrust the government into an unwanted and unaffordable crisis.4' More-
19 Phinis Jones, 481 A.2d at 460.
- The District filed suit against the Board of Elections and Ethics on October 11, 1984, after
its internal review of Phinis Jones, and after the Board of Elections and Ethics responded negatively
to the September 10, 1984, City Administrator's request that the Board reconsider its decision to put
Initiative 17 on the ballot in light of Phinis Jones.
11 In granting limited home rule to the District of Columbia government, the Congress of the
United States expressed reservations about the financial health of the District, and hence, placed fiscal
constraints on the District's home rule powers. Thus, no expenditure of District money (or even money
raised by the District itself from such sources as property taxes, sales taxes, and income taxes) must
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over, it would provide an open arena to citizens disappointed in their efforts to
convince the Mayor or the Council to include funding for specific projects or
programs in the proposed fiscal year budget. This open arena could significance
hinder the competitive legislative process in which the Mayor and the Council
weigh competing demands for limited resources, and make hard choices in order
not to exceed the available resources.
Initially, District law stated simply that citizens could propose laws by way
of the initiative process so long as they were not "laws appropriating funds.
'42
Later the Council enacted procedures governing the initiative process and man-
dated that the Board of Elections and Ethics reject a law that is not a "proper
subject of initiative". A proposed initiative would be considered improper if it
would "negate or limit an act of the Council of the District of Columbia.
' 43
Obviously the phrase "proper subject of initiative" is not self-explanatory, al-
though the words "negate or limit an act of the council" appear clear on their
face.
Unfortunately, the first major case in which the District courts were required
to wrestle with interpretation of the phrases "laws appropriating funds", "proper
subject of initiative", and "negate or limit an act of the Council of the District
of Columbia" involved a highly political project which was the construction of
the District's Convention Center." This may explain why the opinion in Con-
be appropriated by the Congress of the United States. See Section 446 of the District of Columbia
Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, D.C. CODE ANN., § 47-304 (1981). Moreover,
during Mayor Barry's first term as Mayor, and in 1980, the District was beset by a major fiscal crisis
that required the use of layoffs to bring the budget in line with revenues.
42 D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-281(a) and 1-1302(10) (1981) provide: "The term initiative means the
process by which the electors of the District of Columbia may propose laws (except laws appropriating
funds) and present such proposed laws directly to the registered qualified electors of the District of
Columbia for their approval or disapproval." The nature of the District government's relationship
with the federal government, and particularly the District's budgetary process involving the Mayor,
the Council of the District of Columbia, and the Congress, makes it difficult to rely on other ju-
risdictions for an interpretation of the phrase "laws making appropriations." For example, the Council
does not make appropriations for the District; only the Congress appropriates money (including rev-
enues raised by the District government through various local taxes). Moreover, while emergency laws
enacted by the Council take effect immediately, civil acts of the Council may become laws only after
a 30 day Congressional review period, and criminal laws after a 60 day Congressional review period.
See Section 602(c)(1) and (2) of the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Re-
organization Act, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-233(c)(1) and (2) (1981). Nonetheless, it is instructive to
know the approach of other jurisdictions with respect to the concept "laws appropriating funds."
See, e.g., Note, Referendum: The Appropriations Exception in Nebraksa, 54 NEB. L. REV. 393 (1975),
Thomas v. Bailey, 595 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1979), Kansas City v. McGee, 364 Mo. 896, 269 S.W. 2d 662
(1954), State ex. rel. Sessions v. Bartle, 359 S.W. 2d 716 (Mo. 1962), State ex. rel. Card v. Kaufman,
517 S.W.2d 78 (Mo. 1974).
41 D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1320(b)(l)(D) (Supp. 1986), known popularly as the Dixon Amendment
and officially as the Initiative Procedures Act, did not become effective until 1979. A 1982 amendment
removed the phrase "proper subject for initiative" but left intact the words, "negate or limit an act
of the Council." See D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1320(k)(1)(G) (Supp. 1986).
1 In fiscal year 1978 the Council included in a budget amendment act a request for funds to
construct a convention center. The Mayor had proposed the Convention Center at an initial cost of
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vention Center Referendum Committee v. District of Columbia Board of Elections
and Ethics5 is so confusing, and why it was a plurality opinion. It is also im-
portant to note that the en banc court was badly split, a split which in part may
be traceable to particular views about the need to protect a relatively new home
rule government which had not yet reached its tenth anniversary.
The plurality opinion in the Convention Center case (supported in rationale
by three of the nine justices)6 must be read against the dissenting opinion (cham-
pioned by four of the justices). Clearly evident in the plurality decision were two
themes. The first of these themes espoused the need for the fiscal integrity of a
young home rule government. The second theme propounded the unfettered right
of the District's electorate to vote on citizen initiated proposed laws47 a theme
advocated repeatedly by the dissenters. 48 These two, perhaps conflicting themes
$27 million. The total cost was estimated to be $98.7 million. The budget amendment was approved
by Congress and in June 1978 Congress appropriated the $27 million. Some District residents were
opposed to building a convention center in downtown Washington D.C. and sought to block con-
struction by, in essence, repealing the funds appropriated for the initial phase of construction. Those
residents wanted to use the new initiative process. However, the Charter Amendments Act which
provided for the initiative process was not self-executing and the Council had been required to enact
implementing procedures by September 6, 1978. Because the procedures were not in effect by October
1978 (the Council did not act until June 1979), the opponents of the Convention Center proceeded
to file a petition with the Board of Elections and Ethics in October 1978, and sought to enforce the
Charter Amendments Act without legislation. This effort failed, and when the Council considered
the Dixon Amendment in June 1979 (the Initiative Procedures Act), the initiative opposing funds for
the Convention Center project already had been circulated to voters. Hence, many regarded the Dixon
Amendment as an effort to defeat the initiative measure.
" Convention Cent. Referendum Comm. v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections and Ethics, 441
A.2d 889 (D.C. App. 1981). ,
" Two justices supported the decision reached by the three judge plurality.
4' The source of a right to vote on an initiative is the Charter Amendments Act, effective March
10, 1978, D.C. CODE ANN., §§ 1-281(a) and 1302(10) (1981).
" Prior to the en banc decision in the Convention Center case, a three judge panel had analyzed
the issues. See Convention Cen. Referendum Comm. v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections and Ethics,
441 A.2d 871 (D.C. App. 1980). Interestingly enough, there was also a split in the panel which reflected
varied and conflicting themes. Judge Theodore Newman, Chief Judge of the Court, emphasized the
theme of separation of powers and the executive authority of the Mayor, while dissenting Judge
Gallagher zeroed in on the "right to vote" theme. Judge Newman noted the "general rule" that
initiatives apply "only to acts which are legislative in character, and not to those dealing with ad-
ministrative or executive matters." Id. at 874. Because Congress already had enacted the Budget for
the District and thus had already appropriated funds for the Convention Center, "only administrative
tasks were left to be performed in connection with the project and ... the Mayor was vested with
the responsibility for carrying them out." Id. at 880. Thus, since the Mayor was assigned these
administrative or "ministerial" tasks, "the Council could not interfere with the Mayor's performance"
of such tasks; "neither could the electorate so interfere through use of the initiative." Id. at 881.
At the very outset of his dissenting opinion, Judge Gallagher stated: "We are confronted here,
fundamentally, with a right to vote issue.... It is a very basic right." Id. (Gallagher, J., dissenting).
Judge Gallagher also took issue with Judge Newman's conclusion that Convention Center involved
"only administrative-executive acts." Id. at 883-887. Judge Gallagher vested the right to vote on
initiatives as "essentially the basis of Home Rule," and also regarded voting on initiatives as a
portrayal of the "vitality of government." As Judge Gallagher put it: "Other rights, even the most
[Vol. 89
12
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol89/iss1/5
THE HOMELESS
haunted both judges involved with Initiative 17 in the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia. Those judges were Judge Salzman at the temporary re-
straining order and preliminary injunction stage, and Judge Wagner at the "mer-
its" stage of the case.
In Convention Center, Judge Ferren, writing for the plurality, neatly sum-
marized the competing forces: "In construing the amendment, we must weigh two
major public interest concerns of the Council reflected in the Charter Amendments-
the elector's right of initiative and responsible fiscal management-with a view to
enhancing the value of each without undue intrusion on the other."'" (emphasis
added).
Since the Convention Center case involved an effort to reject a budget item
already approved by the Council of the District of Columbia and the Congress,
the issue was basically an easy one for the plurality, but the scope of the plurality
opinion may have produced a more complicated result. The plurality concluded
that District law did not "sanction use of the initiative power to rescind the
legislature's established fiscal plans. '" 5° However, the plurality went on to state:
[W]e conclude that the "laws appropriating funds" exception prevents the
electorate from using the initiative to (1) adopt a budget request act or make
some other affirmative effort to appropriate funds, or (2) to block the expenditure
of funds requested or appropriated as of the effective date of the initiative act.
The Council's fiscal concerns, however, do not compel the conclusion that
the "laws appropriating funds" exception also should be read to preclude wholly
prospective initiatives....
Accordingly, we further conclude that the "laws appropriating funds" ex-
ception does not preclude initiatives (1) to establish substantive authorization for
a new project (2) to repeal existing substantive authorization for a program (with-
out rescinding its current funding) or (3) to prohibit future budget requests.'
Although the plurality had produced an opinion with a somewhat extended scope,
three significant issues remained unclear. First, the plurality left unexplained the
words, "or make some other affirmative effort to appropriate funds." Second,
the opinion failed to clarify the proper interpretation of the words "substantive
authorization for a new project." With regard to this particular phrase, it is not
clear whether or not a difference was intended between words such as "project"
and "establishment," and "program" and "repeal." This is important in de-
termining whether the court meant to focus solely on capital-type specific projects
or on the broader social service programs. Finally, the plurality opinion failed
to explain what it actually meant by "wholly prospective initiatives" or "initiatives
with a prospective but not a present fiscal effect."
52
basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined." Id. at 889, (citing Wesberry v. Saunders, 376
U.S. 1 (1964)).
49 Convention Center, 441 A.2d at 912.
Id. at 913.
Id. at 913-14.
Id. at 914 and 915.
19861
13
Reid: Law, Politics and the Homeless
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1986
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
In contrast to the plurality opinion which considered the "laws appropriating
funds" exception to be "ambiguous on its face," 53 the dissenters believed the
clause to be "plain enough. '5 4 Moreover, relying upon a position taken by the
American Civil Liberties Union (which represented one Councilmember) as amicus
curiae, the dissenters stressed the right of citizens to vote on initiatives and the
need to protect that right "no matter that there may be official apprehension as
to the outcome. ' 55 On the other hand, although the plurality was willing to accept
the basic proposition that "the power of the electorate to act by initiative is
coextensive with the power of the legislature to adopt legislative measures,' 56 and
that "the initiative right should be liberally construed, '5 7 to sustain the initiative,
the plurality nonetheless believed that certain fiscal factors could stop a vote on
an initiative. In the words of the plurality, "the electorate cannot interfere, by
way of initiative, with the legislature's established fiscal plans.
'58
The tension between the plurality and dissenting opinions not only accentuated
disagreement about the need to protect the right to vote on initiatives in order
to strengthen home rule government, but also imparted a vague understanding
about when fiscal considerations should be allowed to prevent citizens from voting
on initiatives. For the dissenters, fiscal considerations important enough to stop
an initiative translated into a "budget request act." In essence, it could be pre-
sumed that only an attempt by citizens to place a formal budget request act before
the electorate through the initiative process could be invalidated. As the dissenters
stated:
Everything costs money and all legislation has some sort of an impact on the
budget....
If we simply translate "laws appropriating funds" as "budget request acts", the
only sensible thing to do, then the Charter language says only that the people
may not, by initiative, themselves propose a budget request act. The unmistakable
meaning of the term is that the people may not by initiative enact an appro-
priations law (or transmit a budget request to Congress)."
Thus, even if the initiative was "fiscally irresponsible"' 6 the vote should take
place. Otherwise, the court would emerge as "the self appointed decider of 'rea-
sonable fiscal management' and hence would be a "super legislature." ' 6'
For the plurality, fiscal considerations translated into not only the adoption
of a budget request act but a forbidden "affirmative effort to appropriate funds"
" Id. at 911.
Id. at 924 (Gallagher, J., dissenting).









West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol89/iss1/5
THE HOMELESS
or to "launch the appropriations process," but "wholly prospective initiatives,"
most of which inevitably involve fiscal outlays (particularly if they are new capital
projects) are not forbidden to the initiative process. Yet, if responsible fiscal
management is the goal of the plurality, would not that goal be undermined by
a series of initiatives which command future budget requests, under the rubric
of the "authorized new project," for a variety of endeavors not previously pro-
posed or advocated by the Mayor or the Council? Moreover, does the term "new
project" refer only to discrete capital projects similar to the convention center
project, or does it encompass social service type programs such as subsistence
entitlements which require substantial outlays to meet the costs of such govern-
ment benefits?
Given these questions about the Convention Center opinion, it is interesting
to note that Judge Newman, writing for a three judge panel, 62 wrote a short and
concise opinion in Phinis Jones. First, he distilled two principles from the Con-
vention Center case: 1) that the electorate may not use an initiative to launch the
appropriations process, and 2) that the electorate may not use an initiative to
make an affirmative effort to appropriate funds.63 Additionally, these two prin-
ciples were supplemented with a third: that the electorate may not use an initiative
to interfere with the management of the financial affairs of the District. This
principle also is traceable to Convention Center. Thus, when citizens interfere
with the management of the financial affairs of the District, they illegally launch
the appropriations process.
After determining that the appropriations process had been launched in the
Phinis Jones case, Judge Newman identified "affirmative efforts" to appropriate
funds for the unemployment compensation initiative through the inclusion of pro-
visions necessitating 1) additional borrowing from the U.S. Treasury (which would
also require additional interest payments), 2) additional appropriation requests
from the Council to the Congress, and 3) automatic increases in benefit levels.
By not using or emphasizing the "authorization for a new project" concept
found in Convention Center, Judge Newman may have helped clear up one of
the inherent ambiguities in applying that concept to Initiative 17, without un-
dermining the Convention Center plurality's goal of enabling the District to achieve
"responsible fiscal management." A logical conclusion is that an initiative which
establishes an entitlement to a government benefit interferes with the management
of the financial affairs of the District, and hence launches the appropriations
I The other two judges included Judge Mack who had joined the plurality opinion in the
Convention Center case and Judge Terry who was not involved in the case.
"' These may be regarded by some as identical principles. However, it is possible to distinguish
between them by regarding the second as the evidentiary principle. In effect, there must be some
evidence of an affirmative effort to appropriate funds before the initiative can be invalidated. The
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process in that it requires that the benefit be given automatically to those who
qualify for it. Consequently, the Initiative necessitates additional appropriation
requests by the Council to the Congress. However, if one focuses on the "au-
thorization of a new project language" and interprets "project" broadly to include
government benefit or entitlement programs, then the plurality's "wholly pro-
spective fiscal implications" language could be used to validate Initiative 17, since
no specific sums of money are mentioned in Initiative 17 as they were in the
unemployment compensation initiative. 4
Initiative 17 was under consideration by the Superior Court of the District
of Columbia from October 11, 1984, to July 19, 1985. The next forum was the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals where the matter was noted for appeal
in the summer of 1985, argued on October 17, 1985, and placed under consid-
eration until May 20, 1986. Judge Salzman, bound by the rules governing a request
for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction order, was the
only judge to quickly render an opinion as early as October 24, 1985. His opinion
reflected the same tension that appeared in the plurality and dissenting opinions
in the Convention Center case. Judge Salzman read Initiative 17 as creating ben-
efits "as a matter of right" and as a measure that "would tie the District's fiscal
hands by making mandatory what is now done only voluntarily." 65 Thus, Judge
Salzman was satisfied that "there is a substantial likelihood that the District will
ultimately prevail on the merits."' ' Nonetheless, Judge Salzman believed that in
balancing the interests of the respective parties, the weight rested on the side of
the right to vote just as the dissenters concluded in Convention Center. As he
put it:
In this Court's judgment, the power reserved to the people to vote on matters
that are before them lies closest to the heart of the democratic process. Whatever
theoretical harm to the initiative process may result from allowing an [sic] possibly
improper vote, the harm in forbidding a vote on a matter that might be proper
is significantly greater.6
Hence, Judge Salzman ruled that the Initiative could not be removed from the
ballot.
Initiative 17 was approved by the electorate by a vote of 114,698 to 43,966
and- in accordance with District law, was transmitted to Congress for the requisite
See Phinis Jones, 481 A.2d 456.
6 District of Columbia v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections and Ethics, No. 12280-84, slip.
op. at 7 (D.C. Oct. 24, 1984) (opinion of Judge Salzman). Judge Salzman also stated that "[a) fair
reading of the initiative, in the Court's judgment, reveals it is designed to create an entitlement to benefits
in those eligible for the shelter program it would establish .... These benefits would create rights in
law that do not now exist and which the District would be obliged to provide by one means or
another." Id. at 5-6.
" Id. at 5.
61 Id. at 11.
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30 day review period. 68 It became law on March 14, 198569 while Judge Wagner
still had the District's motion for summary judgment under advisement.70
Judge Wagner's opinion may have been delayed not only because of the press-
ing and sizeable caseload confronting all Superior Court judges in the District of
Columbia, but also because of the confusion surrounding Convention Center, and
the brief opinion rendered in Phinis Jones. Judge Wagner evidently studied Con-
vention Center in some detail and aligned herself squarely with the plurality opin-
ion. She concluded that Initiative 17 launched the appropriations process because
it "creates a legal right in certain individuals to obtain from the government,
upon request, accommodations meeting the standards specified" in the initiative .7
Moreover, she ruled that Initiative 17 has fiscal implications even though it con-
tains no sum certain, because it is an "open-ended financial obligation" that
involves "intrusion into the budgetary process. ' 72 The result would be that "what-
ever the program's financial requirements, the government must meet them," and
"elected officials are compelled to seek full coverage for the program through
the appropriations process." '73 As such, the initiative constitutes a "prohibited
interference with the financial affairs of the District" and "an affirmative effort
to appropriate funds. ' 74 Judge Wagner sidestepped the "authorization of a new
project" hurdle by interpreting Initiative 17 as authorizing the expenditure of
money for a new project in the face of District law which precludes the electorate
from using the initiative process to appropriate monies or to authorize new proj-
ects. 75 Accordingly, Judge Wagner ruled on July 19, 1985, that Initiative 17 was
not a proper subject of the initiative process.
Although an appeal was taken in summer 1985, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals did not hear argument on the case until October 17, 1985, and
did not render its opinion until the day after the telecast of "The Samaritan,"
a television movie which portrayed the struggle of Mitch Snyder, and the Com-
munity for Creative Non-Violence. It is also interesting to note that the opinion
was released just several days prior to "Hands Across America," the massive
cross-country demonstration and fundraising effort designed to address problems
of hunger and homelessness in America. However, from July 19, 1985, to May
I The Board of Elections and Ethics certified the results of the vote on November 20, 1984.
The initiative, consistent with District law, was published in 31 D.C. Reg. 6088 (1984) as D.C. Act
No. 5-208.
69 D.C. Law 5-146. The law later was invalidated by Judge Wagner, see infra n.71.
The hearing on the motion for summary judgment took place on January 4, 1985.
" District of Columbia v. District of Columbia Bd. of Education and Ethics, No. 12280-84, slip.
op. at 18 (D.C. July 19, 1985) (opinion of Judge Wagner), rev'd 509 A.2d 609 (D.C. App. 1986).
I Id. at 18.
71 Id.
74 Id. at 23.
11 Id. at 21-22.
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20, 1986, no statutory entitlement to shelter for the homeless was recognized in
District law through Initiative 17.76
In District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics v. District of Co-
lumbia, a three judge panel glossed over and left ambiguous the question of
whether the Initiative contained a mandatory statutory entitlement based on a
protected property interest in a government benefit. The court stated that "[n]either
the fact that the initiative may be denominated loosely an entitlement program
nor the provision for judicial review make an initiative a law appropriating funds."
77
What the panel meant by "may be denominated loosely an entitlement program"
is not clear but the language used suggests something less than the protected
property interests mentioned in Goldberg and its progeny. Moreover, the panel
concluded that, unlike the initiative in Phinis Jones, there was no "self-actuating
funding mechanisms" and as a result, "the funding level for overnight shelter
still rests within the power of the elected members of the District of Columbia
government and Congress." Finally, the three judge panel returned to the "pro-
spective fiscal impact" concept which had been enunciated in Convention Center.
The panel decided that the legislative history regarding the "laws appropriating
funds" exception revealed that initiatives having "prospective fiscal impact" were
permitted. This decision must be interpreted as a victory for those advocating an
unfettered right to vote on initiatives. Taken as a whole, the Initiative 17 decision
of the Court of Appeals provided little insight into the rights of the homeless in
the District.
C. Phase Three of the Struggle: A Detour to the Adult Protective Services Act
In the early 1980s, various jurisdictions began to examine adult protective
services acts as instruments to address the needs of the homeless. 7 Among them
was the State of West Virginia. In Hodge v. Ginsberg79 six homeless persons from
Charleston, West Virginia, attempted to prove that they were "incapacitated adults"
under West Virginia's Social Services for Adults Act. 0 Chief Justice McGraw
Th D.C. Law 5-146 Codified at D.C. CODE ANN. §§3-601-3-607.
, Board of Elections, 509 A.2d at 614.
" See Langdon and Kass, Homelessness in America: Looking for the Right to Shelter, 19 COLIUM.
J. L. & PROBS. 306, 327-330 and Appendix, 379-386 (1985). Although various state adult protective
services acts have been pointed to as a possible source of a right to shelter for the homeless, most
were not primarily designed to address the problem of the homeless. Some actually were adopted
during the height of nursing home scandals in the 1970s. These acts vary in provisions. Some are
directed to a mental or physical impairment, or a mental or physical dysfunction, or a mental or
physical incapacitation. Others address the incapacitated or those abused, neglected, or exploited by
a caretaker. Others are aimed at the incapacitated, or those unable to make responsible decisions,
or those unable to care for themselves, or those suffering from a disability or a developmental dis-
ability, or who are disabled or lacking mental or physical capacity, or who are aged and disabled.
Some others speak in terms of imminent risk or death or serious bodily harm, or immediate serious
physical harm.
Hodge v. Ginsberg, 303 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 1983).
'o W. VA. CODE § 9-6-I to -15 (1984 & Supp. 1986). The six also relied on Article Il1, Section 10 of
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ruled that "the term 'incapacitated adult' [in the Social Services for Adults Act]
... was intended by the legislature to encompass indigent persons like the [six
homeless persons who sued], who by reason of the recurring misfortunes of life,
are unable to independently carry on the daily activities of life necessary to sus-
taining life and reasonable health.""' Further, the Chief Justice found that the
West Virginia Department of Welfare had promulgated regulations which estab-
lished "the duty of the department to provide assistance to incapacitated adults
who are the victims of neglect, abuse, or exploitation. 82 Accordingly, the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals granted a writ of mandamus "directing the Com-
missioner of the Department of Welfare to provide emergency shelter, food and
medical care to the petitioners and other similarly situated persons as required by [the
Social Services for Adults Act] ... and ... the Department of Welfare's Social
Services Manual." 3
The District of Columbia Adult Protective Services Act84 was under consid-
eration by the Council of the District of Columbia as the Initiative 17 litigation
unfolded. The Act applies to an adult, 18 years or older who is subjected to
"abuse, neglect, or exploitation by another."' 5 Abuse includes "the intentional
or deliberately indifferent deprivation of essential food, shelter, or health care in
violation of a caregiver's responsibilities, when that deprivation constitutes a se-
rious threat to one's life or physical health."'8 6 Neglect encompasses "the careless
deprivation of essential food, shelter, or health care in violation of a caretaker's
responsibilities, when that deprivation constitutes a serious threat to one's life or
physical health. '8 7 An adult in need of protective services is defined in terms of,
1) a physical or mental impairment, 8 2) abuse, neglect, or exploitation, 9 or 3)
the likelihood of the continuation of abuse, neglect, or exploitation." The range
the West Virginia Constitution which provides that: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, and the judgment of his peers." W. VA. CONST. ART. III § 10.
The due process clause in the West Virginia Constitution "insures that the people receive the benefit
of legislative enactments." Hodge, 303 S.E.2d at 247, (citing Cooper v. Gwinn, 298 S.E.2d 781, sylb.
pt. 1 (W. Va. 1981)). An amicus brief was also filed in the Hodge case by two West Virgina attorneys,
Gene R. Nichol and Charles R. DiSalvo, representing Community Kitchen, Inc. and Romero House, Inc.,
two non-profit organizations that service the needs of homeless people in West Virginia. Using Article III,
Section 10 of the West Virginia Constitution, the amicus attorneys argued that basic subsistence shelter for
the homeless is a fundamental substantive right under the due process and equal protection guarantees
of Article III, Section 10 of the West Vriginia Constitution.
Hodge, 303 S.E.2d at 250.
" Id. at 251.
I d.
, D.C. CODE ANN., §§ 6-2501-6-2513.
" D.C. CODE ANN., § 6-2502.
,6 D.C. CODE ANN., § 6-2501(1)(E).
, D.C. CODE ANN., § 6-2501(9)(D).
A person is covered by the Act if he or she is "highly vulnerable to abuse, neglect or ex-
ploitation because of a physical or mental impairment." D.C. CODE ANN., § 6-2501(2)(A).
-V A person is covered by the Act if he or she is "being or has recently been abused, neglected
or exploited by another." D.C. CODE ANN., § 6-2501 (2)(B).
' A person is covered by the Act if he or she is "likely to continue being abused, neglected
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of protective services which must be provided to an adult covered by the Act,
for 90 days, includes "food, shelter, clothing, health care, home care, counseling,
legal assistance, and social casework." 9'
There are at least three hindrances to a reliance upon the District of Columbia
Adult Protective Services Act as the source of a right to shelter for the homeless.
First, there is no explicit right to shelter included in the Act, although there are
references to the absence of shelter as "neglect" and the provision of shelter as
"protective services." In this context, the Act focuses on abuse, neglect, or ex-
ploitation by another, rather than an individual's abuse or neglect of self, unless
that abuse or neglect "gives rise to instances of abuse, neglect, or exploitation
by another." 92 Second, the traceable, albeit rather ambiguous, legislative history
of the Act suggests that it is not the intent of its drafters to create a right to
shelter by its passage. The Committee Report on the bill that resulted in the Adult
Protective Services Act explicitly states that "this bill is in no way intended to
create a 'right' to shelter or any other specific protective service." 93 However,
the Report also included this ambiguous language:
Should a mentally or physically impaired homeless individual be molested, se-
riously injured, or held "prisoner" by another homeless individual, and should
this conduct be reported to DHS (Department of Human Services), the bill's
provisions might very well be triggered. The relief mandated by the bill, however,
is not to remove the conditions of self-neglect. Appropriate relief, especially when
the abuse is recurrent, might be to seek a protective order enjoining the abuser,
violation of which is subject to contempt of court and imprisonment. Of course
the bill invests DHS with broad discretion to fashion relief, subject to challenge
only upon a finding of bad-faith non-compliance.
In the example given, failure to provide shelter would not constitute bad faith
on the part of DHS .... 9
According to this excerpt, a protective order95 could be obtained by the Depart-
ment of Human Services to prevent someone else from abusing a homeless person,
or exploited by others because he or she has no one willing and able to provide adequate protection."
D.C. CODE ANN., § 6-2501(2)(C).
" D.C. CODE ANN., §§ 6-2501(12), 6-2505.
, D.C. CODE ANN., § 6-2503.
9' COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, COMMITTEE ON HUMAN SERVICES, COMMITTEE REPORT
ON BILL 5-334, ADULT PROTECTIVE SERVICES ACT OF 1984, 7 (October 18, 1984).
SId.
91 It is conceivable that in issuing a protective order involving a homeless person, a judge might
order the Mayor, through the District's Department of Human Services, to provide shelter, food,
and clothing for the homeless person. D.C. CODE ANN., § 6-2506(d)(4) provides that a court may
"direct the Mayor to provide specified or unspecified protective services, including at night and on
weekends if necessary: Provided, that the court shall not direct the Mayor to provide a type of service
not otherwise made available by the District government." Since the District government does provide
services for homeless people, it is at least arguable that despite the legislative history, the Adult
Protective Services Act may be read as commanding services to a homeless person who falls within
the scope of the Act. This is particularly true if one applies canons of statutory interpretation and
the pertinent words of the statute are found to be plain and unambiguous.
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but DHS also could use its discretion to provide other relief which obviously
could include shelter if the circumstances demand such a solution. Yet, providing
shelter, according to the Committee Report, is not to be regarded as mandatory.
Thus, the District of Columbia Adult Protective Services Act is not an effective
route to declaration of a right to shelter for the homeless.9
This journey through somewhat tortuous paths to a statutory entitlement to
shelter for the homeless reveals the interplay of competing political and legal forces
that thus far have blocked a successful outcome in the District of Columbia, as
of September 1986. Thus, clear local statutory provisions governing the rights of
the homeless to shelter and other necessities of life remain absent from District
law. This inevitably leads one to inquire into the possibility of carving out legal
principles governing the rights of the homeless based upon federal constitutional
law.
III. A CONsTITuIoNAL RIGHT TO SHELTER: THE IMPROBABILITY OF THE HoMELEss
BEING DESIGNATED AS A SUSPECT CLASSIFICATION
By initiating legal action in Williams v. Barry,97 advocates of the homeless
in the District of Columbia 8 hoped to establish a constitutional right to shelter,
or a due process property interest for the homeless protected by state law. Es-
tablishing a constitutional right to shelter may well be a hopeless endeavor with
respect to suspect class theory of Equal Protection law. This route clearly seems
foreclosed in view of the 1985 Supreme Court decision in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center.- In Cleburne, Justice White's majority opinion suggest
ed that under Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection analysis, mental retar-
dation is neither a suspect nor a quasi-suspect classification requiring strict or
heightened scrutiny of a legislative classification. As suggested by the Court, men-
tal retardation is a condition best addressed by legislators and professionals. °0
Indeed, lawmakers have manifested sensitivity to the needs of the retarded, as
16 This is in contrast to the 1981 New York State Social Services Law which focuses on risk
of imminent death or serious physical harm to a person who lacks the capacity to understand the
probable consequences of remaining a homeless person. After due process guarantees (notice and
opportunity to be heard with counsel) are implemented, a homeless person can be given protective
services for 72 hours, subject to an additional 72 hours if necessary. The due process guarantees were
added because of a concern that involuntary protective services might violate some of the rights of
homeless persons. See Note, Homelessness in a Modern Urban Setting, 10 FORD AM URn. L. J. 749,
773-776 and accompanying footnotes (1981-1982).
9 Williams, 490 F. Supp. 941.
- The Williams case was brought by the Community for Creative Non-Violence (under the
leadership of Mitch Snyder), two of its members, and some homeless men. See discussion, supra
notes 14-25 and accompanying text.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985). For an analysis of the
Cleburne case, see The Supreme Court, 1984 Term, Leading Cases, 99 HARv. L. REv. 120, 161-173
(1985).
'0 The Court stated "[h]ow this large and diversified group is to be treated under the law is
a difficult and often a technical matter, very much a task for legislators guided by qualified profes-
sionals and not by the perhaps ill-informed opinions of the judiciary," Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3256.
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evidenced by federal and Texas state legislation designed to protect the mentally
retarded. Therefore, judicial intervention is unnecessary because there is "no con-
tinuing antipathy or prejudice"'1' displayed with respect to the mentally retarded.
In fact, the mentally retarded are not "politically powerless." Through their ad-
vocates they have been able "to attract the attention of lawmakers,"1ec with po-
sitive results.101 The opinion noted that in any event, if the door to suspect or
quasi-suspect classification is opened to the mentally retarded, others may have
to be admitted.104
If Justice White's analysis in Cleburne is carried forward in future cases, the
homeless may stand little chance of being added to the list of suspect or quasi-
suspect classifications. While lawmaker sensitivity toward the homeless may not
yet have reached the same degree as that afforded the mentally retarded,1os clearly
the issue of the homeless has forced at least state and local executive branch and
legislative branch politicians to focus on socioeconomic conditions faced by the
homeless.106 In the narrow sense of Justice White's use of the term "politically
101 Id.
102 Id. at 3257.
,01 Legislation passed to assist the mentally retarded, as cited by the Court, includes: Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982); Development Disabilities Assistance
and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6010(l)-(2) (1982); Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(5XB) (1982); and Mentally Retarded Persons Act of 1977, TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN., Art.
5547-300, § 7 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
10I The Court stated: ". . . if the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were deemed
quasi-suspect for the reasons given by the Court of Appeals, it would be difficult to find a principled
way to distinguish a variety of other groups who have perhaps immutable disabilities setting them
off from others, who cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative responses, and who can claim
some degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at large. One need mention in this respect
only the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. We are reluctant to set out on that
course, and we decline to do so." Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3257-58. See also Massachusetts Board
of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (age); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981)
(mental illness), James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) and San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973) (low-income status, poverty, and wealth).
"I See Note, Building a House of Legal Rights : A Plea for the Homeless, 59 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 530, 533 (1985). But see HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMM.
ON HousINo AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA-II, VOLUMES 1, 2, AND 3, 98TH
CONG., 2D SESS., (1984); HOUSE Comm. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMM. ON
HousNo AND Com&uirr" DEVELOPMENT, Ho ELESSNESS IN AMERICA-I, 97TH CONGRESS, 2D Sass., (1982);
SENATE COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, 98TH CONG., IST SESS., STREET PEOPLE, (1983); HOUSE COMM.
ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, SUBCOMM. ON HUMAN RESOURCES, OVERSIGHT HEARING ON RUNAWAY AND
HOMELESS YOUTH PROGRAM, 97Tn CONG., 2D SaSS., (1982); HOUSE CoMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERA-
TIONS, SUBCOMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND HUMAN RESOURCES, FEDERAL RESPONSE TO
THE HOMELESS CRISIS, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., (1984); HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, SUBCOMM. ON
HOUSING AND CONSUMER INTERESTS, HOMELESS OLDER AMERICANS, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., (1984); SEN-
ATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMM. ON THE CONSTITUTION, HOMELESS YOUTH: THE SAGA OF
"PusHouTS" AND "THRoWVAWAYS" IN AMERICA, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., (1980).
"0' See e.g., CITY OF CHICAGO, REPORT OF THE MAYOR'S TASK FORCE ON THE HOMELESS (1984)
[hereinafter cited as CITY OF CHICAGO REPORT]; R. SALERNO, HARDSHIP IN THE HEARTLAND: HOME-
LESSNESS IN EIGHT U.S. CrrIs, (1984); Cal., Joint Hearing on the Homeless Before the Assembly
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powerless," the homeless may not be so powerless as they have also evidenced
an ability to attract the attention of lawmakers. However, attracting the attention
of lawmakers may not end the political powerlessness of groups such as the home-
less. Even if the Court abandons the somewhat unique quasi-suspect classification
analysis in Cleburne for future cases, the homeless still seem to have little chance
of being elevated to a suspect or quasi-suspect classification. Immutability of
characteristics which can produce prejudice is one of the traditional elements
previously held necessary for suspect or quasi-suspect status. Yet, homelessness
is not an immutable characteristic, 0 7 unlike the color of one's skin'
°" or a person's
gender.'09 Therefore, it is unlikely that the homeless would gain suspect or quasi-
suspect classification on the basis of some immutable characteristic.
Under the famous footnote analysis found in United States v. Carolene Prod-
ucts, 0 suspect classification results from a "discrete and insular minority" status.
Human Services Comm. and Senate Health and Human Services Comm. (1985); McGERioLE AND LAU-
RIAT, MORE THAN SHELTER: A COMMUNITY RESPONSE TO HOMELESSNESS; REPORT AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS OF Tm PROJECT "HoMELESSNESS: ORGAN ZING A CommUNiY RESPONSE"; MARYI.AND DEPARTMENT
OF HUMAN RESOURCES GOVE.RNOR'S ADVISORY BOARD ON SHELTER, NUTRITION AND SERVICE PROGRAMS
FOR HOMELESS INDIVIDUALS IN MARYLAND, INTERIM REPORT ON Tm STATE HOMELESS PROGRAM, (1985);
[hereinafter cited as MARYLAND INTERIM REPORT ON THE STATE HOMELESS PROGRAM]; McGERIOLE, MAN-
AGEMENT OF FAMILY HOUSING CRISIS IN THE CITY OF BOSTON, (1979); HEALTH AND WELFARE COUNCIL
OF CENTRAL MARYLAND, A REPORT TO m GREATER BALTIMORE SHELTER NETWORK ON HOMELESSNESS
IN CENTRAL MARYIAND, (1983); [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON HOMELESSNESS IN CENTRAL MARY-
LAND]; COMMUNITY SERVICE SOCIETY, INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL WELFARE RESEARCH, ONE YEAR LATER:
THE HOMELESS POOR IN NEw YoRK CITY (1982). A few state judicial systems also have addressed
the problem of the homeless (in addition to those discussed in the body of this article). See e.g.,
Callahan v. Carey, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 4 (N.Y. App. Div., Dec. 5, 1979) (discussed
in Homelessness: A Litigation Roundup, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1255, 1255-1256 (1985); See also
Malone, Homelessness in a Modern Urban Setting, 10 Fon.Am URB. L. J. 749 (1982); Note, Es-
tablishing a Right to Shelter for the Homeless, 50 BROOKLYN L. REv. 939, 943-947 (1984); other state
cases discussed in Homelessness: A Litigation Roundup, supra at 1256-1258, 1262-1264, and Ross v.
Board of Supervisors (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, filed June 11, 1984) (discussed in CLEAR-
INGHOUSE REV. 1209 (1985)).
- See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
- See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976); Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
"- In addition to race and gender, national origin has been identified as an immutable char-
acteristic. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948), Korematsu, 323 U.S.
214, and Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). The homeless have no inherently immutable
characteristic although there are certain factors by which one can readily identify the homeless: for example,
old, tattered, or dirty clothing; possessions packed into shopping bags, trash bags, and other para-
phernalia; and sleeping in doorways or on grates at night. While the homeless do not have inherently
immutable characteristics such as color and gender, they are subjected to stigma or opprobrium insofar
as they are stereotyped and perceived as inferior. There generally is no more than a cursory effort
to identify the various elements of our society, personalities and backgrounds that are lumped together
in the catagory called the homeless, and stamped as inferior. Stigma or opprobrium also have been
used as a basis for suspect and quasi-suspect classification and the concomitant strict scrutiny or
heightened scrutiny of legislative classifications. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677 and Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
110 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938): "Prejudice against
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Examples of discrete and insular minorities that have been accorded suspect clas-
sification status are aliens, and persons of different national origin."' They have
been isolated in American society because they have no obvious anonymity: a
simple glance usually confirms a racial status, and an accent often reveals a dif-
ferent national origin or an alien status. Moreover, they have been subjected to
a history of purposeful discrimination or unequal treatment. While the homeless
are found in pockets of some cities and states across the country, generally they
are diffused throughout America and throughout cities and states. They are not
a population isolated in the same geographical area of the country, or the same
area of a city or state due to their homelessness. Although some homeless people
are easily identifiable by tattered and dirty clothes as well as worn shopping bags
or trash bags containing their possessions, others are not. Furthermore, the home-
less have not experienced, solely because of their homeless status, the same type
of longstanding purposeful discrimination or unequal treatment that racial mi-
norities and aliens have traditionally faced in this country. In any event, such
treatment has not yet been documented. Similarly, the homeless have not ex-
perienced the same type of exclusion from the political process that required the
protection of racial minorities and aliens under the Carolene Products doctrine. "
2
Indeed, some communities already have extended voting rights to the homeless
despite the fact that they cannot satisfy the general requirement of having a fixed
address."' Some states have accorded other rights to the homeless through their
legislative process. 1 4 Nonetheless, the discrete and insular minority route to sus-
pect or quasi-suspect classification appears closed to the homeless.
It is worth noting, parenthetically perhaps, that today even blacks and his-
panics might no longer achieve suspect classification under the Carolene Products
and Cleburne theories. As Professor Bruce Ackerman has put it bluntly, "[t]he
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition which tends to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for
a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."
"I See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (alienage and national origin); See also
In Re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (alienage); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (alienage);
Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (political function exception to the strict scrutiny test for
aliens); Strauder, 100 U.S. 303 (race); Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214 (race); Loving, 388 U.S. I (race);
Oyama, 332 U.S. 633 (national origin).
,2 See, e.g., Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (state law excluding blacks from Democratic
primaries); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, rev'd, 322 U.S. 769 (1944) (white primary); Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (exclusion of blacks from pre-primary election of the Jaybird Democratic
Association); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964) (state law requiring that race of a candidate
appear on the election ballot); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (Voting Rights
Act of 1965).
11 See Ruling of the District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics which permits homeless
persons to vote, N.Y. Times, August 29, 1984, and Pitts v. Black, 608 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1984);
No. 84 Civ. 5270 (S.D.N.Y., October 10, 1984) where the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of New York invalidated a bona fide residence test as applied to the homeless.
"' See Homelessness: A Litigation Roundup, supra note 106, at 1255-1258.
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Carolene formula cannot withstand close scrutiny.""' 5 This is true if political
power is defined in terms of "the old politics of exclusion" where racial minorities
were excluded from "passive" (voting) and "active" (legislative) roles in the po-
litical process. Given the gains of racial minorities in state, local, and federal
political processes," 6 it is no longer true that racial minorities do not "attract
the attention of lawmakers," as Cleburne put it. Yet, a pluralist political process
still can ensnare racial minorities in disadvantaged social, economic, political, and
educational positions that require the application of fundamental constitutional
values if notions of equality are to be safeguarded. This idea regarding the need
of law or principles "higher" than those which emanate from the politics of
pluralist democracy is best stated by Ackerman: "[t]here are constitutional values
in our scheme of government even more fundamental than perfected pluralism
most notably, those that bar prejudice against racial and religious minorities.
' "17
If the theme of prejudice is placed within the context of a "changing political
reality," then we can avoid a situation where "we shall have passively allowed
the Constitution's profound concern for racial equality and religious freedom to
be trivialized into a transparent apologia for the status quo."" 8 If Ackerman's
approach is taken, there may be at least a remote chance of inclusion, as a quasi-
suspect classification, of the homeless whose interests are not represented in local,
state, and federal legislatures, whose needs are not debated and systematically
addressed in legislative halls, and whose exclusion from society is based on the
stigma of homelessness, and its accompanying "evils" such as mental illness,
physical illness, mental retardation, poverty, and unacceptable physical appear-
ance. '" 9 But the Supreme Court has given no sign of a willingness to embrace
such an approach. Indeed, Cleburne clearly rejects any approach of this kind.
' Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HAiv. L. RaV. 713, 717 (1985). See also Note,
Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L. J. 1237, 1254 (1974) for a suggestion of changes
in the Carolene Products discrete and insular minority approach to suspect classification, with respect
to political powerlessness.
116 See Stone, Black Political Power in America (1968), and publications of the Joint Center for
Political Studies, such as the Center's monthly newsletter, Focus.
1,7 Ackerman, Supra, note 115 at 746. Ackerman also argued that:
We must repudiate this reduction of the American Constitution to a simple system of plu-
ralist bargaining if we are to reassert the legitimacy of the courts' critical function. Although
the bargaining model captures an important aspect of American politics, it does not do
justice to the most fundamental episodes of our constitutional history. We make a mistake,
for example, to view the enactment of the Bill of Rights and the Civil War Amendments
as if they were outcomes of ordinary pluralist bargaining. Instead, these constitutional
achievements represent the highest legal expression of a different kind of politics one char-
acterized by mass mobilization and struggle that, after experiences like the Revolution and
the Civil War, yielded fundamental principles transcending the normal processes of interest
group accommodation. It is only by reasserting the relevance of this tradition of consti-
tutional politics,... that we shall gain the necessary perspective to put pluralist bargaining
in its place as one but only one form of American democracy, and the lesser form at that.
Id. at 743.
Id. at 746.
,, In 1948 the Welfare Council of New York City wrote a report (issued later in 1949) stating,
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The homeless do not constitute a homogenous population. Thus, a suspect
classification analysis may prove elusive because of the difficulty of developing
any principle of constitutional theory. The homeless include minorities who are
already considered as being within a suspect classification because of race, and
women who are in the quasi-suspect classification because of gender, but the
homeless also are composed of mentally retarded, mentally ill, and elderly people
who have been rejected for suspect or quasi-suspect classification. Moreover, the
ranks of the homeless also embrace ex-convicts, persons with middle class so-
cioeconomic roots, and some who are well-educated. But the Court has rejected
poverty or wealth as a basis for analysis as a suspect or quasi-suspect classifi-
cation. 120
among other things:
The number of homeless men in New York in need of free lodging, custodial care, or
rehabilitative services is currently on the increase. . . . Present facilities for housing and
caring for indigent homeless men of the city are grossly inadequate.... There is much public
misunderstanding of the nature and composition of the homeless group often referred to
as "bums" and "derelicts" which needs to be corrected if appropriate remedial action is to
be taken. Informed analysis of the group is the starting point for intelligent planning.
WELFARE COUNCIL OF NEW YOR.K CrrY, HOMELESS MEN IN NEW YORK CITY (1949).
This discussion of the 1948 homeless problem in New York City remains relevant with respect
to the current homelessness crisis. The U.S. Conference of Mayors reported "that demand for shelter
increased by 89% in 1983, with 53 percent of 66 cities surveyed saying they were unable to meet the
demand." Mapes, Faulty Food and Shelter Programs Draw Charge that Nobody's Home to the
Homeless, 17 NATIONAL J. 474,475 (March 2, 1985). Cities have increased their expenditures for
emergency shelters; for example, Chicago spent $405,387 in Fiscal Year 1983, $690,151 in Fiscal Year
1984, and $1 million in Fiscal Year 1985. See CITY OF CHICAGO REPORT, supra note 106, at 16. While
the ranks of the homeless still contain those commonly associated with homelessness (e.g., alcoholics),
newcomers are obvious. For example, many of the new homeless are younger people (30 years old
and even younger), the newly unemployed, the victims of entitlement program cuts, those with psy-
chiatric problems, families (with children) who cannot make ends meet, single women, and an in-
creasing number of minorities. Causes of the new homelessness have been identified as: 1)
Deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill without appropriate community support services (see CITY oF
CHICAGO REPORT, supra note 106 at 15; SALERNO, supra note 106 at 475; MARYLAND INTERIM REPORT ON
THE STATE HOMELESS PROGRAM supra note 106, at 5; REPORT ON HOMELESSNESS IN CENTRAL MARY-
LAND, supra note 106, at 41; 2) an acute shortage of low-income housing (see CITY OF CHICAGO
REPORT, supra note 106, at 15; Mapes, supra at 475; MARYLAND INTERIM REPORT ON THE STATE
HoMELEss PRoai. supra note 106 at 4); 3) Economic conditions, including unemployment (see CITY OF
CHICAGO REPORT, supra note 106, at 15; SALERNO, supra note 106, at 5, 13; LAIRD, TREVOR'S PLACE,
133, (1985)); 4) Substance abuse (See LAIRD, supra at 132); 5) Changing federal policies regarding
grants and entitlements (See Mapes, supra at 474-76; The homeless face an "acute need for health
care services;" CrrY OF CHICAGO REPORT, supra note 106 at 36. For a detailed examination of the
health problems of the homeless ranging from the effects of trauma, to infestation, vascular disease,
leg ulcers, alcohol and drug abuse, hypertension, diabetes, chronic pulmonary disease, tuberculosis,
and the effects of exposure and thermal stress, see BRICKNER et al., HEALTH CARE OF HOMELESS PEOPLE,
(1985). For other data on the homeless see Note, supra note 106 at 939-43; Langdon and Kass,
Homelessness in America: Looking for the Right to Shelter, supra note 78, at 306-23 (1985); Note,
supra note 105, at 530-38.
2I See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); James, 402 U.S. 137.
See also Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term Foreward: On Protecting the Poor Through
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Until a theory of suspect classification is developed, based on notions of
stigma and opprobrium, prejudice, and political representation, it is difficult to
see how the current Supreme Court could place the homeless into the suspect or
quasi-suspect class in light of Cleburne. Accordingly, a starting point in positing
a theory of suspect or quasi-suspect classification for the homeless is stigmatization
and resulting prejudice. Partly because blacks historically have been subjected to
stigmatization which flows from derogatory stereotypes that produce prejudice,
the suspect classification analysis is available to them. The homeless, too, have
been stigmatized as, among other things, alcoholic, drug addicted, crazy, irre-
sponsible, and unclean. It is arguable that this type of stigmatization is equivalent
to the stigma of illiteracy found in Plyler v. Doe,'2' the stigma of race due to
a badge of inferiority found in Brown v. Board of Education,22 and the stigma
of illegitimacy found in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 23 and Matthews
v. Lucas. 24 If a person suffers from the stigma of homelessness, that person is
likely to be shunned in any effort to obtain employment which might generate
the resources essential for the necessities of life. Hence, the stigma of homelessness
is likely to "foreclose any realistic possibility that they [the homeless] will con-
tribute in even the smallest way to the progress of our Nation."'1
2
If the concepts of stigma and prejudice are supplemented with the concept
of political representation or meaningful political representation, the seeds of an
acceptable and principled equal protection and suspect classification theory may
be planted. The concepts of political representation or meaningful political rep-
resentation are used intentionally, instead of a notion of political powerlessness
usually articulated in suspect classification analysis. To the extent that political
powerlessness means simply the failure to attract the attention of lawmakers, it
would not support a suspect classification for the homeless. To the extent that
political powerlessness connotes the failure of a local, state, or federal legislature
to enact laws to protect those suffering from homelessness, it might support a
suspect classification for the homeless if no such laws emanate from these leg-
islative bodies. If political representation or meaningful political representation
is substituted for political powerlessness, however, and if it embodies a notion
of the active representation of particular interests in a legislative body, then the
absence -of representatives who actively and openly advocate the interests of the
the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. Rav. 7 (1969). As the Court said in Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464, 471 (1977): "In a sense, every denial of welfare to an indigent creates a wealth classification
as compared to nonindigents who are able to pay for the desired goods or services. But this Court
has never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection
analysis."
Plyler v Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
' Brown, 347 U.S. 483. See also the campanion case of Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
1 Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
"' Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976). See also Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983); Mills
v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982).
2I See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223.
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homeless and draft bills into law that are designed to protect those interests might
underscore the need of the homeless for extraordinary protection from the ma-
joritarian political process. 2 6 This is particularly true in times when the nation's
attention is focused on deficit reduction requiring accumulation rather than dis-
tribution of governmental resources.
27
IV. A CONsnTunoNAL RGHT TO SHELTER: THE ImpROBABIITY OF THE DESIGNATION
OF THE RIGHT TO SHELTER AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OR INTEREST
Another approach to a Fourteenth Amendment constitutional right for the
homeless, the fundamental right or interest approach, should be examined, al-
though it is not the most promising of approaches. Fundamental rights or interests
have been carved out of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as well as the Due Process Clause, and any state regulation which concerns
a fundamental right or interest is subjected to strict scrutiny or critical exami-
nation. 
28
In determining whether an asserted right is constitutionally protected, the
Court generally inquires whether the right is "explicitly" or "implicitly" guar-
anteed by the Constitution. 2 9 Among the fundamental interests or rights rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court are the right to marry, procreate and bring up
children,' 30 the right to individual and marital privacy, 3' the right to participate
in elections on "an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction,"'3 and the
right to interstate migration or the right to travel from one state to another.' 3
On the other hand, the Court has concluded that education "is not among the
rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find
any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected."'
' 34
"1 For a discussion of the "we-they" theory which revolves around a notion of political power
which connotes political impotency due to the absence of representatives of the class in question from
the legislature, see Note, supra note 113.
," See Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99
Stat. 1037 (1985) which requires, in Sections 251 and 252, the elimination of the full amount of the
national deficit excess reported by the Comptroller General. The constitutionality of the Act was
challenged and the Supreme Court of the United States ruled parts of the act unconstitutional during
its 1985 term. See Bowsher v. Synar, 54 U.S.L.W. 5064 (U.S. July 7, 1986).
I See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); San Antonio, 411 U.S. 1.
11 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Memorial Hospital, 415 U.S. 250.
See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Zablocki, 434 U.S. 374, and Loving, 388 U.S.
1.
'J' See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
,12 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Harper v. Virginia St. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966).
' See Dunn, 405 U.S. 330; Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618.
' San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 35. Nonetheless, in a case involving the free public education of
children of undocumented aliens the Court applied a heightened scrutiny test, reasoning that education
is more than a "governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legis-
lation," and that "illiteracy (of the children of any disfavored group) is an enduring disability."
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221-22.
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Obstacles exist with respect to the application of the fundamental right or
interest approach to the homeless. It is arguable that the Supreme Court has
already ruled that the right to shelter is not a fundamental interest under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Lindsey v. Normet,135
a case concerning the constitutionality of Oregon's Forcible Entry and Wrongful
Detainer statute, the Supreme Court stated:
We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. But
the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic
ill. We are unable to perceive in that document any constitutional guarantee of
access to dwelling of a particular quality, or any recognition of the right of a
tenant to occupy the property of his landlord beyond the term of his lease without
the payment of rent or otherwise contrary to the terms of the relevant agreement.' 6
Furthermore, the Court in Lindsey suggested that "[a]bsent constitutional mandate,
the assurance of adequate housing and the definition of landlord-tenant relations
are legislative, not judicial functions.' 37
Thus, Lindsey has apparently closed the door on a Fourteenth Amendment
right to shelter through the Equal Protection Clause.
However, a close reading of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rod-
riguez, Plyler v. Doe, and Lindsey v. Normet, indicates that the door to a fun-
damental right to shelter may not be tightly closed. This is true if one limits
Lindsey to a decision concerning the adequacy of shelter, rather than access to
shelter. Consider that in Lindsey there was no "absolute deprivation of a mean-
ingful opportunity to enjoy" shelter (as there was no absolute deprivation of a
basic minimum education in San Antonio). The individual in question had access
to shelter but quarreled about the adequacy of the shelter. 3 1 In contrast, the
homeless have encountered an absolute deprivation of any opportunity to enjoy
shelter unless it is provided to them by the government or a private person or
entity. To the extent that a state classification can be interpreted as cutting off
any access to shelter by the homeless, Lindsey may not be controlling.
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
93 Id. at 74.
I" d. One commentator has written:
[Ciommon sense tells us that housing is quite important. But a right to housing has only
sporadically been recognized in nonconstitutional situations. Its link to other constitutional
rights is tenuous at best. And the precise contours of even a minimal right to housing have
not received the general agreement of informed observers.
Tushnet, supra note 22, at 282.
'I3 In examining whether wealth should be a suspect classification, the Court in San Antonio v.
Rodriguez noted that the advocates for the children involved in the case did not argue that "the
children [are] receiving no public education; rather [they argued] that they are receiving a poorer
quality education [than] children in districts having more assessable wealth." Rodriquez 411 U.S. at
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Nonetheless, the requirement that a fundamental right be "explicitly or im-
plicitly guaranteed by the Constitution" may be a stumbling block. The Court
was able to resolve at least two "basic necessities of life" cases under the fun-
damental rights doctrine, not because welfare assistance or medical care were
considered fundamental rights, but because the cases implicated a right to inter-
state migration or a right to travel interstate which is implicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution, and because the durational residency requirements in those cases
penalized the right to interstate migration.
139
In the case of the homeless, a starting point in the effort to establish a con-
stitutional basis for the right to shelter may be found in the Cleburne dissent
written by Justice Marshall and joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun. In
that dissent, Justice Marshall focused on a right to "establish a home" as one
of the fundamental liberties recognized under the Due Process Clause in Meyer
v. Nebraska.'" Said Justice Marshall, "[t]he interest of the retarded in estab-
lishing group homes is substantial. The right to 'establish a home' has long been
cherished as one of the fundamental liberties embraced by the Due Process
Clause."'141
Consequently, a plausible fundamental rights approach might advocate a
homeless person's "fundamental right to establish a home," a right to shelter
inherent in that right to establish a home, and a right to shelter as a basic necessity
of life. Whether such an approach could command a majority of the United States
Supreme Court, however, is questionable in view of the converse argument that
what is at stake is not the right to establish a home since there is no force or
law that prevents the homeless from renting or buying a place to live. Rather,
what is at stake and what is being advocated is the right and the duty of the
government to create a shelter for a homeless person, and no such right or duty
presently exists.
Another approach, suggested by one commentator, requires a focus on the
Ninth Amendment to the Constitution, the "catchall" amendment which states
that the enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights is not to be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people. Since this Amendment is so
broad, it could be argued that the right to shelter is a right retained by the
people. 
42
One additional forward step based on heightened scrutiny of classifications
involving possessory interests in property may flow from Plyker 43 In Plyler,
the Court refused to carve out a fundamental right to education (as in San
" See Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618 and Memorial Hospital, 415 U.S. 250.
' Meyer, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3266.
141 See Steinberg, Adequate Housing For All: Myth or Reality?, 37 U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 63, 65-
71 (1975).
' Plyler, 457 U.S. 202.
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Antonio v. Rodriguez) but nonetheless applied heightened scrutiny in the reso-
lution of the case. Heightened scrutiny was applied because of the stigma of
illiteracy which was perceived as an enduring disability. In essence, undocumented
alien children are the offspring of a "disfavored group" and members are of the
"underclass". Without education they cannot hope to "raise the level of esteem"
in which the majority of our society holds illegal aliens.'" Thus, because these
children faced a potential "lifetime hardship" due to the stigma of illiteracy, and
because no national or congressional policy had been articulated against the ed-
ucation of alien children, the Court applied heightened scrutiny in determining
the validity of the Texas tuition requirement for such children. Similarly, one
could argue that the distinction between adequate shelter and access to shelter
combined with the stigma and vulnerability of the homeless, and their inevitable
descent into the ranks of the "underclass," at least requires heightened scrutiny
of any classification based on homelessness."4 One weakness of such an argument,
however, is that not all homeless people are without fault with regard to their
predicament (as in the case of undocumented alien children), unless one is pre-
pared to maintain that homelessness itself is the result of some type of mental
state that mirrors legal incompetency.
V. CONCLUSION
The homeless are a vulnerable population in American society, ignored and
despised by many. As a study commissioned by the United Community Planning
Corporation of the City of Boston stated, "[tihe need for a place to live ... to
place one's bed, cook one's food, shelter one's children and store one's pos-
sessions . . . is so elemental a need that to be deprived of it is one of the classic
examples of human privation."' While an increasing number of concerned cit-
izens and activists have decided to address the plight of the homeless, state and
federal executive branches of government as well as state and federal judicial
systems, for the most part, have failed to provide much needed guidance to resolve
the problems of the homeless. The current administration, in fact, has identified
homelessness as a problem which the federal government has no duty to address.
In the administration's view, that duty belongs to state and local governments.
47
While massive non-governmental movements such as "Hands Across America,'
' 48
Id. at 216, n. 14, 219, 220, and 222.
For a discussion of the concept "underclass" see GLAsGow, THE BLACK UNDERCLASS, 3-15
(1980); see gernerally RACE, POVERTY, AND THE URBAN UNDERCLASS (Cottingham ed. 1982). For a
discussion of heightened scrutiny in the Cleburne case see The Supreme Court, 1984 Term, Leading
Cases, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 120, 161-173 (1985).
McGerigle, Management of Family Housing Crisis in the City of Boston, 40 (1979).
" While testifying before a House Budget Committee, on February 18, 1986, James C. Miller,
III, President Reagan's Director of the Federal Office of Management and Budget said: "We believe
that the homeless are not a Federal responsibility but a State and local responsibility." New York
Times, February 19, 1986.
14 "Hands Across America" is "a project of the United Support of Artists for Africa (USA
for Africa), a non-partisan, private sector initiative designed to combat hunger and homelessness in
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or smaller organizations such as the Community for Creative Non-Violence can
arouse public empathy and raise funds to assist the homeless, these interests are
without the ability to articulate legal principles to protect the homeless, nor can
they bring about the necessary institutional response that would meet the needs
of the homeless. In contrast to the dedicated efforts of these non-governmental
groups, the federal government has treated the homeless in Washington, D.C. as
virtual pawns in a political game. A closer look at this contest reveals the legal
maneuvering of the conservative administration that has abandoned its promise
to the homeless, and the desires of the local minority-controlled government that
does not wish to bear the burden of that promise in light of the attendant financial
responsibilities and legal complications that would follow.
This notion seems inconsistent with a governmental system that prides itself
on the principles of fundamental fairness, common decency, ordered liberty, and
fair play. Nonetheless, it appears that the system can only be aroused by the
problems of the homeless in the instance of a single fasting individual whose
health began to deteriorate significantly, presenting potential embarrassment for
the government. It is also objectionable that the judicial system would delay de-
cision on a critical social problem and release that decision the day after a national
telecast of a movie depicting the work of Mitch Snyder and the Community for
Creative Non-Violence on behalf of the homeless. Moreover, even though the
decision validated a citizen's initiative on the right of the homeless to shelter, it
included only an ambiguous sentence concerning the concept of entitlement of
the homeless to shelter. This development merely confirms the belief that the
entitlement concept in the area of subsistence social services has been pushed aside
and placed on the shelf of issues not currently in vogue, in order to accomodate
the philosophy and spirit of the conservative administration. In the case of the
homeless in the District of Columbia, no definitive mandatory statutory entitle-
ment to shelter has been enunciated by the highest local court despite the specific
words of Initiative 17.
It should be noted that three of the most vulnerable populations in contem-
porary American society today are prisoners stuffed in badly overcrowded cor-
rectional facilities without proper services or humane conditions, victims of the
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), and the homeless. In the case
of prisoners, the Supreme Court of the United States has articulated principles
based on the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution by
which the behavior of governmental officials can be measured to determine whether
it passes constitutional muster. Thus far, however, the Supreme Court either has
not been given or has not seized any opportunity to announce legal principles
that would guide governmental officials in their interactions with the victims of
America." On May 25, 1986, the group sponsored a demonstration involving "a continuous line of
Americans, standing hand-in-hand, coast-to-coast, across a 4000 mile route." See Communication
from the Washington, D.C. branch of "Hands Across America" (March 22, 1986).
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AIDS, or the homeless. Yet, even if the Supreme Court were to address home-
lessness today from a constitutional perspective, it is doubtful that a majority of
the Court would regard the homeless as a suspect or quasi-suspect classification
under equal protection theory. Furthermore, it is equally doubtful that a majority
of the Court would rule that the homeless have a constitutional right to shelter
or a due process protected substantive right to shelter.
What is missing and what is urgently needed, in the case of the homeless,
is a set of uniform principles concerning how a democratic, pluralistic society
should view and treat its homeless. In other words, values based on legal concepts
are needed to guide the behavior of American officials in local, state, and federal
governments toward the homeless. 149 Without such uniform principles or values,
the local, state, and federal governments may continue to close their eyes and
ears to the needs of the homeless. The homeless, then, would be left to the mercy
of the occasionally unkind political process, or would be dependent upon the
sympathies of the private sector which, with its limited resources, cannot possibly
address the subsistence needs of all the homeless throughout this country.
Now may be the time for the legal community to develop, and distribute
widely, model codes on .the rights of the homeless. Now may also be the time
for judges, in appropriate cases, to enunciate clear principles regarding acceptable,
unacceptable, and inadequate treatment of the homeless by federal, state, and
local governments. Finally, now is the time for politicians to resist election year
promises to the homeless in favor of persistent and principled leadership in ra-
tionally planned legislative and executive governmental efforts to resolve an em-
barrassing American social problem: the existence of homeless people in the midst
of a wealth nation which prides itself on concepts of common decency, fun-
damental fairness, ordered liberty, and a sense of fair play.
1,9 Mashaw, for example, suggests a "Dignitary Process" approach grounded in such values as
self-respect, individual liberty, and equality. He posits that there is an "individual right to legal
arrangements that preserve the preconditions for moral agency and self-respect." J. Mashaw, supra
note 23, at 220. See also a review of Mashaw's book and idea, Diver, The Wrath of Roth, 94 YALE
L. J. 1529 (1985). Others have suggested principles which should govern the mentally ill homeless
who have been deinstitutionalized without proper community treatment. See Rapson, The Right of
the Mentally Ill to Receive Treatment in the Community, 16 CoLUM. J. L. & Soc. PRoBs. 193 (1980).
As early as 1942, Ralphe Bunche, political scientist and Statesman, said: "The real objective must
always be the good life for all of the people .... peace, bread, a house, adequate clothing, education,
good health, and above all, the right to walk with dignity on the world's great boulevards." This
quote was discovered by Professor Lawrence S. Finkelstein of Northern Illinois University. L. Fin-
kelstein, Draft Paper for the Conference "Ralph Bunche: The Man and His Times," (May 5, 1986)
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